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Wars of National Liberation: Jus Ad Bellum
by Robert E. Gorelick*
The author examines the current debate concerning the right of certain col-
onial peoples to employ force in seeking to attain "self-determination. " His
analysis is conducted in light of existing principles of international law, em-
bodied for the most part in various United Nations documents. At the heart
of this jus ad bellum debate are the differing interpretations given those prin-
ciples by the member nations. The author concludes that while the existence
of a right to "self-determination" has at least been acknowledged, the ques-
tion as to the appropriate means to that end remains largely unresolved.
W HILE CERTAIN COLONIAL peoples have been accorded the
right of self-determination, it is certain that these peoples are not
sovereign states and thus are not subjects of international law in the
same way as are States. After international jurists have made great ef-
forts to prove that certain peoples have a right of self-determination, it
remains to be seen if they also have a jus ad bellum. It is certainly
possible that they have been accorded one right by the international
community, and not the other.
The question which has been posed has not only been if a people
have the right to employ force in attaining self-determination but also
whether other States have the right (or even the duty) to aid the people
in their struggle. It is clear that if the conflict were to be considered as
an internal one there would be no international prohibition to the use
of force, but third States would clearly be under the obligation not to
interfere in the international affairs of another State and hence could
not aid the people in their battle. On the other hand, if the conflict
were international, the right of third States to aid the colonial people
would be easier to prove, but the right of that people to employ force
would be all the more difficult to maintain. This difficulty arises from
the prohibition of the use of force as declared in article 2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations.'
Indeed it would seem that a war of national liberation2 is an inter-
national conflict. United Nations practice has illustrated that self-
*Doctoral Candidate, L'Institut de Haute Etudes Internationales, Geneva.
GOODRICH, HAMBRO AND SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COM-
MENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (3d ed. 1969).
2 A war of national liberation is defined by its goal-the implementation of a
recognized right of self-determination. Consequently, the so-called wars of national
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determination is not a matter strictly between the colonizer and the
colonized, but is a matter of international concern which does not permit
derogation with reference to article 2(7). Rosylin Higgins has written,
"it seems academic to argue that as Assembly resolutions are not bind-
ing nothing has changed, and that self-determination is a mere
'principle,' and that article 2(7) is an effective defence against its im-
plementation. s" 3 As international law has been concerned with the for-
mation of the right of self-determination, with the conditions of col-
onial peoples while under colonial domination, with the illegality of
the use of force to prevent the realization of the right, and with the
conditions of captured combatants of liberation movements, it is
natural that the implementation of the principle of self-determination
be of vital concern. This argument has been recently confirmed in ar-
ticle 1(4) of the first Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions on humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, which clearly
states that wars of national liberation must be considered as interna-
tional conflicts. 4
I. SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST COLONIALISM
The recognition of wars of national liberation as international con-
flicts bound the movements of liberation to respect article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force. The only excep-
tion to this article which is available to an individual actor is article 51
liberation which aim at the overthrow of a particular government, such as the war in
Chad led by the Frolinat or the urban guerilla conflicts of Latin America and Europe
would clearly not fall within this category.
R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 101 (1963).
4 Article 1 defines the scope of application of Protocol I relating to international
armed conflicts. Paragraph 4 of this article states:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupa-
tion and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
The paragraph referred to is a reaffirmation of common article 2 of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 which reads, "the present convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties. . ....
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which guarantees the "inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs. . . ." It was then only natural that
supporters of liberation movements attempted to use this article to
legitimize their struggles against colonialism. The war and victory in
Algeria, the invasion of Goa, the frustration caused by continued col-
onial domination, and the radical position of independent Algeria all
provided a catalyst for the development of theories regarding national
liberation.
Supporters of the liberation movements were hampered by the
reference to "armed attack" as being a precondition for the exercise of
the right of self-defence. Many theorists, one of these being Hans
Kelsen, favour a strict interpretation of the article. Kelsen argues that
self-defence is valid, "only if, and that implies after, an armed attack
occurs."' This idea has found support among the Socialist and many
Third World States. Often writers attribute particular importance to
the word "inherent," arguing that this implies a pre-existing right of
self-defence which is accepted by the U.N. Charter. Kelsen accepts this
argument and even states that self-defence is part of jus cogens and
thus cannot be modified by a treaty such as the Charter. Yet he points
out that the pre-existing right is perfectly compatible with the Charter
provisions concerning armed attack.' This interpretation is accepted by
Ian Brownlie, who has written that a broad interpretation of article 51
lends support to the now illegal doctrine of forcible self-help. Thus,
many imperialist campaigns, such as the Anglo-French invasion of
Egypt in 1956, were justified by claims of self-defence despite the
absence of a previous armed attack.7 In this sense, self-defence and ag-
gression can be seen as two sides of the same coin.
It might be argued that another right of self-defence exists in
customary international law which is available to States, as rights
assumed under customary law continue to exist concurrently with the
Charter as long as the former do not contradict the principles of the
latter. Yet such an argument would be difficult to sustain considering
that there exists a specific article which deals with this right. Also, the
inclusion of the word "inherent" implies that this customary rule is only
codified in the Charter and that the "two rules" are one and the same.
I H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 914 (1951).
6 Id. at 791-805,
1I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 255
(1963).
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Indeed, as Brownlie points out, by 1945 the customary rule of self-
defence was identical to a stricto senso interpretation of article 51, that
is that self-defence was only legitimate following an armed attack.8
The problem is that as colonialism is regarded by many States as
being morally wrong, it is not in itself an armed attack or an immi-
nent use of force. Many Third World States thus attempted to change
the very notion of what constitutes a use of force which would justify
the exercise of the right of self-defence.
The drive to recognize a war of national liberation as an act of
self-defence, led by Ghana, India and Yugoslavia during the meeting
of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations in Mexico City in
1965, was torpedoed by the Western States. These States insisted that
all decisions of the Special Committee should be taken by consensus in-
stead of by majority vote, which thus gave them a veto power over pro-
posed draft resolutions. This impasse led to a continued stalemate on
the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and the right of
self-determination. Yet, because the final Declaration was a result of
such a consensual process, its legal value was enhanced. During these
years there was a growing consensus among the Third World States
that article 51 must be given a wide interpretation by the expansion of
the definition of "force." By 1966 almost every speech by a represent-
ative of an Afro-Asian State in the Sixth Committee debates on Friend-
ly Relations supported this idea.9
8 Id. at 255, 273-74. Even if we accept the concept of anticipatory self-defence,
the question of intention to use armed force is still present. On anticipatory self-
defence, see R. HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 200; Waldock, The Regulation of The Use
of Force by Independent States in International Law, RECUEIL DES COURS 497 (1952).
1 For the debates of the Sixth Committee on the Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, see 17
U.N. GAOR, C.6 (753-777th mtgs.) 95, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 732-777 (1962); 19
U.N. GAOR, C.6 (802-825th, 831-834th mtgs.) 107-258, 279-295, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 778-836 (1964); 20 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (870-898th mtgs.) 184, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 837-898 (1965); 21 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (924-942d mtgs.) 157, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 899-955 (1966).
The Special Committee was established by G.A. Res. 1966, 18 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No.15) 74, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). Its first session was convened in Mexico
City on August 27, 1964. For its debates, see 20 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Items
90 and 94), U.N. Doc. A/5746 (1965); 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 87),
U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966); 22 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 87), U.N. Doc.
A/7326 (1968); 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969); 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No.18), U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
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The Western States rejected outright any such interpretation of ar-
ticle 51. The British delegate pointed out that the Charter was clear as
to this point and an expanded definition of what constitutes force
would amount to a condemnation of the growing interdependence of
the world community, since as interdependence increases, so does the
political and economic influence of each State over another.' 0 In the
course of these debates," the Western States were usually supported by
the Latin Americans,'" while the Afro-Asians were supported by the
Socialist States.' 3
During the Special Committee debates there was agreement on the
prohibition against organizing or encouraging armed bands for inva-
sions into another country and from involvement in foreign civil strife,
but there was no agreement as to whether these two principles were
applicable when a people was deprived of its right to self-
10 21 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (930th mtg.) 180, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 899-955 (1966).
11 For the debates on Friendly Relations, see note 9 supra. For the debates on
the Definition of Aggression in the Sixth Committee, see 22 U.N. GAOR, C.6
(1017-1025th mtgs.) 373, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 959-1025 (1967); 23 U.N. GAOR, C.6
(1028th, 1073-1082d, 1096th mtgs.), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1026-1099 (1968); 24 U.N.
GAOR, C.6 (1164-1170th mtgs.) 330, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1100-1175 (1969); 25
U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1202-1209th, 1211-1213th mtgs.) 139, 197, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1176-1244 (1970); 26 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1268-1276th, 1281st mtgs.) 123,197, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1245-1307 (1971); 27 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1346-1352d, 1366th, 1368th,
1371st mtgs.) 201, 315, 343, 364, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1308-1393 (1972); 28 U.N.
GAOR, C.6 (1439-1445th mtgs.) 222, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1394-1459 (1973); 29
U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1471-1489th, 1502-1505th mtgs.) 41, 227, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1460-1521 (1974).
For the debates within the framework of the Special Committee on the Defini-
tion of Aggression, see 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.20), U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969); 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19), U.N. Doc. A/8019 (1970); 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
19), U.N. Doc. A/8419 (1971); 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19), U.N. Doc. A/8719
(1972); 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973); 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No.19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
1" See, e.g., Columbia, 20 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (893d mtg.) para. 14-18, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 837-898 (1965); Panama, 18 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (824th mtg.) para. 8, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR. 778-836 (1963). See also Latin American draft submitted to the
Special Committee on Friendly Relations, which embraces the stricto senso definition
of self-defence. 22 U.N. GAOR, Annex Vol. 3 (Agenda Item 87) para. 27, at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/6799 (1967).
i" See, e.g., Bulgaria, 18 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (807th mtg.) para. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 778-836 (1963); Ukraine, 20 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (875th mtg.) para. 19,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 837-898 (1965); USSR, 20 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (883d mtg.) para.
5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 837-898 (1965).
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determination. Certain non-aligned delegates insisted that the words,
"if such acts of intervention involve the use of force without affecting
the scope of Article 51 of the Charter," be incorporated into the pro-
hibition, thus implying that these principles were not applicable to
wars of national liberation which were wars of self-defence engendering
the right of collective self-defence.
Paragraph 7 of the proposed draft resolution submitted by Algeria,
Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, the
United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia suggested that, "[t]he prohibi-
tion of the use of force shall not effect the right of people to self-
defence against colonial domination in the exercise of their right to
self-determination." The proposed draft resolution of Britain,
Australia, Canada and the United States denied the legitimacy of all
uses of force except by a competent United Nations organ or in the in-
herent right of self-defence. A joint Italian-Dutch Amendment to this
proposal attempted to create a compromise and stated that all states
should comply with the Charter and provide for self-determination of
dependent peoples in order to prevent the use of force.
This same debate was continued within the context of the debates
on the definition of aggression. Within the Sixth Committee, Syria
argued that article 51 should be interpreted broadly and that it was
thus applicable to people who were oppressed, colonized or expelled
from the land of their birth. 14 Indeed, given the flexibility of such a
definition, it would be difficult to find a group who could not invoke
article 51. A similar call for a broader interpretation of article 51 was
often repeated. 15
Madagascar introduced a new nuance into the debates. Without
justifying its argument, it propounded the unlikely theory that article
51 had two senses, one that self-defence could be invoked against armed
force, and secondly, that self-defence could be used in questions of ex-
ercising the right of self-determination.' 6
Western States continued their opposition arguing that self-
determination had nothing to do with a definition of aggression. They
argued that self-defence could only be invoked in international rela-
tions, and that relations between a colonizing power and the colonized
14 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1204th mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1176-1244
(1970).
" See, e.g., Afghanistan, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1206th mtg.) para. 50, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1176-1244 (1970).
16 Id. at para. 75.
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people were not international. They claimed that only armed force was
aggression. Ideological or economic coercion fell within the realm of
non-intervention and thus article 51 was not relevant in those situa-
tions. 17
Other Afro-Asian States were wary of this reversal of traditional
roles which found the non-aligned States arguing for a broad inter-
pretation of article 51, while the Western States sought a more strict
reading of the same. These were most notably the Arab States, who
feared the Israeli use of the theory of anticipatory self-defence as in
1956 and 1967. These States, led by Egypt, argued that colonialism in
itself constituted a use of force. Most States, they contended, misinter-
preted the very nature of colonialism. The maintenance of a colonial
administration was not equivalent to force in its widest sense, but con-
stituted an armed attack in itself.18
Another argument within this stricto senso school aimed at a much
more limited right of rebellion. Kenya claimed, as did a great number
of moderate Third World States, that if force was used to deprive col-
onial peoples of the right of self-determination, the colonial people
would have the right to rebel. 9 This argument, as will be seen, was
the interpretation given by the Western States to the provisions in
General Assembly Declarations concerning wars of national liberation.
II. COLONIALISM AS PERMANENT AGGRESSION
The argument that colonialism is permanent aggression represents
another attempt to surpass the restrictive terms of article 51. Unlike
the theories which have already been examined, this school of thought
perceived of colonialism not as aggression in the present, but as occur-
ring in the past. The basis of the argument is that at its inception, the
colonial regime was installed by armed force and that as long as the
effects of this armed force continues, so does the initial aggression. On
"7 In the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Mexico
took the lead in urging that there could be no such thing as "economic aggression." 23
U.N. GAOR, Special Committee on Aggression, A/AC. 134/SR. 1, at 50.
For the view of the Western States, see id. at 125 (United Kingdom); id. at 163
(France); see also 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19) para. 30, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/8019
(1970).
18 Egypt, 24 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1168th mtg.) para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1176-1244 (1969); Togo, id. (128th mtg.) para. 19.
19 23 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1080th mtg.) para. 45, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1026-1099
(1968); see also, id. at para. 69 (Pakistan).
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the other hand, it might be argued that this territory was acquired by
force at a time when this method of territorial acquisition was legal
and thus one cannot apply contemporary legal norms ex post facto.
This thesis was most eloquently argued by India at the Security
Council after the invasion of Goa. The Indian contention was that
Portugal had obtained sovereign rights in Goa from an "unabashed ap-
plication of force, chicanery, and trickery inflicted on the people of
India 450 years ago . . . it was a process of pure and simple
conquest."20 India maintained that the initial conquest was illegal. India
then asked, "if the vivi-section of India was immoral and illegal ab in-
itio how can it be moral and legal today?" 2' As concerns estoppel India
argued that because of British colonial rule for 425 years it could not
contest Portugese control, but that since independence, India has con-
sistently contested the legality of the Portuguese presence. Thus, India
claimed that it had acted in self-defence against the continued aggres-
sion of colonialism against the Goan people, who are one and the same
as the Indian people. 22
The American representative responded that it was true that self-
defence would have legitimatized the use of force, but denied that self-
defence was applicable because Goa was "a defenceless territory," and
as such posed no threat to India. The Americans thus did not even
respond directly to the Indian claim of continued aggression, stating
only that there could be no double standard in the use of force. If
force could not be used to impose a colonial regime neither could it be
used to destroy it.23 The Western States regarded self-defence against
an aggression committed 450 years ago, and which was, at the time,
legal, as being far-fetched. They instead saw India as having committed
an act of aggression against Portugal. The Portuguese representative
stated, "In the circumstances the Portuguese Government considered
that it was being made a victim of unprovoked aggression."2 4
The Western refusal to accept the colonial aspect of the problem
only served to cloud the issue. Theorists, such as Quincy Wright, have
written that despite the controversy over whether the initial conquest of
Goa was legal or not, 450 years of general recognition (not necessarily
by India-which is only a neighboring State and which had no other
20 16 U.N. SCOR (987th mtg.) para. 37, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 987 (1961).
"1 Id. at para. 39.
22 Id. at para. 77.
" Id. at paras. 89-95.
214 Id. at para. 18.
Vol. 11:71
99WARS OF NA TIONAL LIBERATION
legal relation to Goa, but by the international community) had
established a title. 2 Wright, in support of his contention, has pointed
to the statement of the Indian Commissioner on the Ledakh boundary
dispute commission in 1961 relevant to Chinese claims, "It is un-
precedented in the history of international relations that after one state
has publically exercised full administrative jurisdiction for several cen-
turies over certain regions another state should raise a dispute regard-
ing their ownership. '2 6 Yet this argument overlooks the difference be-
tween control over a neighboring area and European classical col-
onialist control of overseas territories. This difference has been made
explicit by Wright himself in another article. 7 These overseas ter-
ritories have a status which is distinct from the metropolitan State.
Wright's argument that territorial integrity implies all territories over
which the State exercises de facto control has been refuted by the en-
tire movement towards decolonization. General Assembly Resolution
1542(XV) 2 8 recognized Goa as a non-self-governing territory and thus
Portugal was under the obligation to pave the way for self-government
in keeping with article 73 of the United Nations Charter. The question
is thus no longer whether Portugal had a legal title to the territory,
but whether in the exercise of their right of self-determination the
Goans had the right to use force, and whether this right could be
assumed by India either from the Charter provisions on collective self-
defence or from the argument that Goans are Indians.
If we did accept the original act of colonization as constituting an
armed attack in the sense of article 51, we might then ask when the
right to respond in self-defence ceases to be a right. Article 51 provides
that the victim State must immediately report an armed attack to the
Security Council and that after the Council acts to restore the inter-
national peace and security this right of self-defence is no longer valid.
The measure which has most often been taken by the Council is to call
for a cease fire, thus implying that once the violent aspect of the con-
flict ceases (even if the conflict of interest remains), the victim State no
longer has the right to act in self-defence and must attempt to settle
the dispute by peaceful means. This seems to imply that as there was
no violence in Portuguese-Indian relations at Goa, India had forfeited
21 Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 622 (1962).
26 Id. at 624.
27 Wright, Self-Determination and Recognition, 98 RECUEIL DES COURS (1959).
28 G.A. Res. 1542, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) 30, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
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its right of self-defence. The obligation of the aggrieved State to "im-
mediately" report a violation to the Security Council implies that the
duration of this right is a short one and in any case is less than 450
years.
The argument that colonialism represents permanent aggression
was not used much by the anti-colonial States during the debates on
Friendly Relations and on Aggression. Its main fault seems to have
been the difficulty of providing that military conquest was a delicta
juris gentium during a time when this method of territorial acquisition
was not only legally respectable, but even morally compelling.
The Security Council was divided and unable to pronounce on the
Goa incident. In any case, it was clear that the Western States rejected
out of hand any attempt to legitimize the use of force by colonial
peoples with reference to self-defence. The debates on Friendly Rela-
tions were marked by progression towards a homogeneity of thought
among the Afro-Asian States, which was represented in the school ad-
vocating a broad interpretation of article 51. It was perhaps the inef-
fectiveness of this argument, given the Western States' persistent
resistance, which led to a proliferation of schools of thought evident in
the debates on the Definition of Aggression. Thus, a joint draft resolu-
tion proposed to the Special Committee on the Definition of Aggres-
sion which was submitted by Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana,
Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain, Uganda, Uraguay
and Yugoslavia read: "The inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence of a State can be exercised only in case of the occurrence
of armed attack (armed aggression) by another State in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter."2 9
The Special Committee agreed that while other types of aggression
existed, only armed aggression was implied in article 51.30 By 1971,
while certain individual States in the Special Committee attempted to
assimilate self-defence and wars of national liberation, this practice
was not upheld in the proposed draft resolutions of the Third World
States which attempted only to exempt wars of national liberation
from the concept of aggression. The consensus grew toward a new
thesis and away from arguments invoking article 51. The new theory
stressed that article 2(4) and the definition of aggression was inap-
plicable to wars of national liberation and that in such cases the use of
2'9 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.20) para. 10, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969).
30 Id. at para. 27.
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force was legitimate. The basis for this legitimacy was what I shall call
the rule of exception.
III. THE RULE OF EXCEPTION
It has been pointed out that the Socialist States supported the
Afro-Asian States in propogating the self-defence thesis. Yet on the
whole, these Socialist countries, rather than running the risk of enlarg-
ing the scope of article 51, led the way in the formulation of this rule
of exception. It was argued that a right to revolt existed independently
of other legal rights. This right was either seen as a primordial right or
as a right which was intertwined with the right of self-determination.
The constant repetition of words such as "inherent" or "sacred" in this
connection seemed to imply that it was a natural norm (a strange
argument indeed coming from the Socialist camp). In the Khrushchev
note of 31 December 1963, Chairman Khrushchev called the recourse
to arms of an oppressed people, a "sacred right.""1 This distinction
between a just and an unjust war met criticism from the Western bloc.
Britain repeated the American contention in the Goa debates rejecting
a double standard in the use of force by certain peoples.
While addressing the General Assembly in 1960, Chairman
Khrushchev introduced this formula: "We welcome the sacred struggle
of the colonial peoples for their liberation. . . . Moral, material and
other assistance must be given so that the sacred and just struggle of
the peoples for their independence can be brought to its conclusion. 31 2
This school is marked by moving and poetic speeches, which,
nonetheless, are often replete with untenable assumptions which con-
fuse morals with law. It is often argued that as colonialism is a fun-
damentally evil institution there is a certain inherent justice in its
eradiction, even by force. Despite the fact that certain illegal acts
might seem inherently just because the end in view might be accepted,
this act of expediency in itself does not transform the act into a legal
act. Arguments within this school, in that they have not attempted to
differentiate between legal and moral rights and give no justification
for the existence of a legal right, remain unconvincing on this strictly
legal level.
s' Manconduit, La Note Krouchtchev, [1964] ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique).
32 15 U.N. GAOR (869th mtg.) Vol. 1, para. 223, U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 864-907
(1960).
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The Latin American States were less hesitant to support the Afro-
Asians outside the domain of article 51. The proposed draft resolution
of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico on Friendly Relations of
1967 outlined a plan whereby colonial rule was seen as illegal and thus
the destruction of it would not be a disruption of the territorial integrity
of a State. They flatly rejected the argument that colonial peoples had
no rights in international law because they were not constituted in
their own State units. 3  The Western States maintained the argument
that colonial peoples could have no rights and also claimed that no
legal system could possibly grant a right to rebel as this would destroy
the legal system itself.3 4 Third World States maintained that as the
right of self-determination existed this was proof that colonial peoples
had rights in international law. it was further pointed out that where
there was a right there was a remedy.35
Since jus ad bellum was thus implicit in the very notion of self-
determination, some States argued that the right to struggle against
colonialism was a "basic principle of the Charter. 31 6 Revolt was con-
sidered as an inherent right and thus article 2(4) could not be seen as
relevant to wars of liberation. Article 2(4) was viewed as referring to
territorial aggrandizement and not to liberation.3" The attempts of the
Socialist and Afro-Asian States were thus focused on exempting wars of
national liberation from the provisions defining what constitutes ag-
gression.
This argument clearly implies that certain uses of force are illegal
while others, which are not directed "against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations,"3 are legal. This interpreta-
3 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) para. 113 at 36, U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969).
"' Id. at para. 168.
" This argument was implicit in the drafting group's report to the Special Com-
mittee on the Definition of Aggression. 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 18, U.N. Doc.
A/9019 (1973).
For such arguments within the Sixth Committee of the Twenty-fifth Session
alone, see, e.g., Zambia, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1208th mtg.) para. 11, at 176, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1176-1244 (1970); Mali, id. (1207th mtg.) para. 62 at 172; USSR, id.
(1208th mtg.) para. 7 at 175; Rumania, id. (1207th mtg.) para. 15 at 168; Ukraine,
id. (1207th mtg.) para. 42 at 171; Libya, id. (1208th mtg.) para. 12 at 176; Tanzania,
id. (1213th mtg.) para. 5 at 203.
36 See, e.g., Mali, 28 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1444th mtg.) para. 14 at 273, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1394-1459 (1973).
11 16 U.N. SCOR (987th mtg.) para. 138 at 28, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 987 (1961).
38 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
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tion of article 2(4) is certainly contrary to the spirit of the Charter
which wished to make all uses of force by individual States illegal aside
from cases of self-defence. Such an interpretation could be abused to
legitimize aggression by States which claim that their use of force is not
contrary to the principles of the Charter. Forcible self-help is clearly il-
legal in contemporary international law as was demonstrated by the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.3 9
IV. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
There has been a virtual deluge of resolutions from the General
Assembly, which have agreed with Resolution 2105(XX), asserting
"the legitimacy of the struggle by peoples under colonial rule to exer-
cise their right of self-determination and independence. '40 The repeti-
tion of this concept has had more the effect of shouting in air than of
creating legally binding norms, because of the simple reason that the
Western States have consistently refused to endorse it. These resolu-
tions, while mustering commanding majorities, have consistently lacked
Western support. 41
The lack of support for these resolutions is proven by the totally
different formulation of the most important General Assembly resolu-
tions entitled Declarations. In these cases the anti-colonialist States
were anxious to assure as great a consensus as possible, and thus took
into account the opinion of all the States, including the Western ones.
The most important Declarations on this subject have been the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among the States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations42 and the Declaration on the Definition
3" [1949] I.C.J. 36.
4' G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.14) 3, U.N. Doc. A/6104 (1965).
4 The exception has been resolutions which condemn specific and unpopular
cases such as Portugal, although even in this case, the United States and the United
Kingdom have normally resorted to abstaining rather than voting in favor. See G.A.
Res. 2270, 22 U.N. GAOR, Fifth Extra Session, Supp. (No.1) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6657
(1967); G.A. Res. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.18) 63, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2795, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 104, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A.
Res. 2918, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.30) 81, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res.
3061, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
42 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
[hereinafter cited as Friendly Relations] G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at
131, U.N. Doc. A/8028, (1970).
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of Aggression. 43
The fourteenth paragraph of the preamble of the Declaration on
Friendly Relations reads, "Convinced that the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant contribution
to contemporary international law, and that its effective application is
of paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations among
States, based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality .... " 44
The words "effective application" are indeed the key words to the
entire problem of jus ad bellum, and their ambiguity does nothing to
resolve the basic problem of what constitutes such a method of apply-
ing equal rights and self-determination. While the socialist and radical
Third World States tended to favor revolt only after the failure of at-
tempts at a peaceful transition, the Western States argued that the
peaceful method in the Charter was an "effective application" of self-
determination.
The first principle treated in the Declaration is the prohibition of
the use of force. The last paragraph of this section reads, "Nothing in
the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or
diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter con-
cerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.1 45 Therefore, while
the traditionally legal uses of force were affirmed, the scope of article
51 was not altered, which manifests a reaffirmation of the stricto senso
school, that is, that self-defence can only be invoked following an armed
attack. The entire tone of this section of the Declaration makes it clear
that only armed force was envisioned, and thus colonial peoples were
not accorded a right to revolt under article 51. The use of force
against colonial peoples with the goal of subverting their efforts to
claim their independence was condemned.
The fifth principle of the Declaration on Friendly Relations reaf-
firms the "right" of self-determination, "in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Charter. " 46 This represents a full acceptance of the
Western thesis. No right of revolt is granted, but there is a reaffirma-
tion of the prohibition of the use of force against colonial peoples. If
41 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression [hereinafter cited as Definition of
Aggression] G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974).
44 Friendly Relations, note 42 supra.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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such force were used, the colonial people have the right to revolt and
may receive assistance from other States.47
A prohibition of the disruption of the territorial integrity of every
State is contained in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. Yet it
asserts that the status of colonies differs from that of the metropolitan
areas, and therefore, decolonization cannot be seen as a threat to the
territorial integrity of States.
During the explanation of votes, it became evident that there
would be no consensus regarding the import of the Declaration. The
Third World and Socialist States regretted the Declaration's omission
of any reference to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Certain delegations deplored the
fact that the right to rebellion was not made absolutely clear. 4 Russia
maintained that the right of self-defence was actually recognized by
the Declaration 49 while other States held that this "right" was simply
not prejudiced by the Declaration."0 Yugoslavia stated that it would
have preferred an unequivocal confirmation of the right to self-
defence.5" Syria saw the Declaration as a confirmation of the most
radical thesis-that the colonial peoples could use any means to
liberate themselves and could receive assistance in so doing. The Latin
American States either did not comment, or expressed satisfaction with
the relevant sections of the Declaration.5 2 France was still not sure why
the issue of force in colonial matters was being discussed, as it was a
domestic issue, yet its delegation interpreted the Declaration to mean
that if force were used against colonial peoples, the latter would gain a
4 The Declaration states, "[I]n their actions against and resistance to such forci-
ble action in pursuit of the right of self-determination, such peoples are entitled to
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter."
Friendly Relations, note 42 supra.
41 Mongolia, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1182d mtg.) 30, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1176-1244 (1970); Algeria, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1181st mtg.) 24, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR. 1181.
41 For the Soviet view of wars of national liberation, see Ginsburg, Wars of Na-
tional Liberation and the Modern Law of Nations - The Soviet Thesis, 29 L. & CON-
TEM. PROB. 910, 910-42 (1964).
50 India, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1183d mtg.) para. 9 at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1176-1244 (1970); Afghanistan, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1182d mtg.) para. 16-17, at 30,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1182 (1970); Libya, 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1182d mtg.) 33,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1182 (1970).
5' 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.18) 75, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
12 Chile, id. at 75-77; Argentina, id. at 77-79; Venezuela, id. at 79-83.
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right to revolt and to receive support."3 The second part of the French
interpretation was the position of most Western States and seems to be
confirmed by the wording of the document.
The Definition of Aggression, like the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, was adopted without vote. The sixth preambular paragraph
reaffirms the prohibition of the use of force against colonial peoples,
"[r]eaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive
peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and in-
dependence, or to disrupt territorial integrity. " 5 4 Article 7 represents
an affirmation of the rule of exception. Thus, whereas article 3
enumerates acts which characterize aggression, these acts should not be
seen as aggressive if used by a colonial people according to article 7,
which reads:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and in-
dependence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived
of that right and referred to in the Declaration of . . .Friendly Rela-
tions . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.5
Article 7 thus reaffirms the position of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations that if force is used against colonial peoples the latter have
the right to rebel.
Most Socialist and Third World States saw article 7 as justifying a
right to revolt.56 Madagascar confirmed that this was the correct inter-
pretation of article 7, but regretted that the right to self-defence was
not made explicit, 7 implying that self-defence was the basis of the
right to revolt in view of the "continued aggression" of colonialism. 8
53 Id.
14 Definition of Aggression, note 43 supra.
55 Id.
" See Kenya, 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1474th mtg.) 57, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.
1460-1521 (1974); Libya, id. (1477th mtg.) 72; Algeria, id. (1479th mtg.) 86; Senegal,
id. (1480th mtg.) 91; Ghana, id. (1480th mtg.) 92; Burundi, id. (1482d mtg.) 109;
Tunisia, id. (1482d mtg.) 111; Cameroon, id. (1483d mtg.) 120; Egypt, id. (1483d
mtg.) 122; Sudan, id. (1504th mtg.) 243.
57 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19) 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
58 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1747th mtg.) 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1460-1521
(1974).
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On the other hand, Canada stated that article 7 gave the right to struggle
by peaceful means, 59 a view that was seconded by pre-revolution Por-
tugal.60 Britain, taking a more liberal stand, declared that the Defini-
tion contained nothing new in this respect and only reconfirmed the
pre-existing right to revolt when armed force had been used against
the colonial peoples. 6' France once again could not seem to com-
prehend the relevance of article 7 within a definition of aggression
since the former was an internal matter. 62
The American delegation saw article 7 as a reaffirmation of the
provisions in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, yet pointed out
that neither one mentioned the use of force and therefore did not
legitimize its use. 6 The American representative stated that article 7
could not legitimize a use of force which would, "otherwise be
illegal."6 4 This assertion was further supported by the American
delegate to the Special Committee who stated that article 7 did not
create a right to revolt, but only implied an exception to article 2(4).65
The Americans thus seemed to fully embrace the rule of exception
thesis, which is also confirmed by the Declaration, that is, wars of na-
tional liberation are an exception to the prohibition against the use of
force.
V. THE 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949
International relations since World War II have been dominated
by almost continued warfare in what has come to be known as the
Third World. The deficiencies ofjus in bello, even as it has been revised
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, were made apparent by the pro-
liferation of guerrilla warfare. This method of combat was commonly
used by movements of liberation, owing to the disparity in military
capabilities between the colonial power and the colonized people. The
law of armed conflicts, which was designed to regulate traditional
59 Id. (Canada)
60 Id. (Portugal)
I1 Id. (Britain)
62 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19) para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974). See supra
note 57, at para. 22.
63 Id. at para. 24.
64 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1480th mtg.) 98, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1460-1521
(1974).
65 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.19) 24-27, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
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European inter-State wars, was largely unable to adequately regulate
this new type of conflict. The growing consciousness of this insufficiency
led to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts. 66 This Conference completed its work in 1977 with the adoption
of two additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocol I
was concerned with conflicts of an international character while Pro-
tocol II treated internal conflicts. The importance of these Protocols in
relation to colonial peoples is that they will, when ratified, represent a
contractual obligation of all parties to the Protocols to recognize and
apply the provisions relating to wars of national liberation.
These two Protocols are concerned with jus in bello67 and only in-
directly touch the question of jus ad bellum. Issues regarding wars of
national liberation dominated the Conference, beginning with the
question of whether the national liberation movements should be in-
vited to participate. 68 The most important issue evident from Protocol
66 For an account of the history of humanitarian law up until the time of the
Diplomatic Conference, with special reference to wars of national liberation, see Abi-
Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 ANNALES D' ETUDES INTER-
NATIONALES 93 (1972); Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Wars of Na-
tional Liberation, 57 RIVISTI Di DIRITTO INTERNATIONALZE 153 (1974); Meyrowitz, Les
guerres de liberation et les Conventions de Geneve, 6 POLITIQUE ETRANGERE 607
(1974).
For discussion of the problem of humanitarian law and guerilla conflict, see M.
VEUTHEY, GUERILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE (Institut Henry Dunant, Geneva, 1976).
67 The study of jus in bello and wars of national liberation is much more
developed than that ofjus ad bellum. See Abi-Saab, Les Guerres de Liberation Na-
tionale et la Conference Diplomatique sur le droit Humanitaire, 8 ANNALES D, ETUDES
INTERNATIONALES 63 (1977); Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics?
The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1
(1975); Meyrowitz, note 66 supra; Salmon, La Confdrence Diplomatique sur la Reaffir-
mation du Droit Internationale Humanitaire et les Guerres de Liberation Nationale,
12 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27 (1976); Veuthey, Guerres de Liberation
et droit Humanitaire, 7 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 99 (1974).
68 This question was resolved when the Conference decided, without vote, to in-
vite the thirteen movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the
movement recognized by the League of Arab States, to participate without vote. On
the separate question of the participation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of South Vietnam, the Conference decided not to accept the presence of the PRG. See
Salmon, La Participation du GRP du Sud Vietnam aux Travaux de la Conference
Diplomatique sur la Reaffirmation et le Dgveloppement du Droit Internationale
Humanitaire Applicable dans les Conflits Armds, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 191 (1976); Meyrowitz, supra note 66, at 617.
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proceedings was the First Commission's decision to consider wars of na-
tional liberation as being within article 1 of Protocol I. This article
defined those conflicts which would be considered as being of an inter-
national character. 69
Article 1 of draft Protocol 1,70 which was elaborated upon by a
committee of experts and presented to the Conference in June 1973 in
the name of the International Committee of the Red Cross, merely
reconfirmed common article 2 of the 1949 Conventions and thus did
not include wars of national liberation.7 1 No less than six amendments
were proposed to this article, five of which advocated the addition of
wars of national liberation to the category of international conflicts.7"
The divergence among these proposed amendments concerned the
question of a definition of wars of liberation and not on the issue of
their international character. On the other hand, a group of eight
States, mostly Western, proposed an amendment advocating the reten-
tion of the 1949 definition and the application of the famous "Martens
Clause" to those combatants who did not fall within the protected per-
sons category.73
Article 1 was adopted on March 22, 1974. 1 The fourth paragraph
reads as follows:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph [which recon-
firms common Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions] include armed con-
69 Wars of national liberation were also discussed in relation to the question of
the status of prisoners of war, in final articles 43 and 44.
70 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Resolu-
tions of the Diplomatic Conference. Int'l. Red Cross, Geneva, 1970,
71 In proposed article 42, the ICRC suggested that if the States so desired, par-
ticipants in movements aimed at national liberation might be treated as if they were
prisoners of war.
12 The conflict over the definition of wars of national liberation was at the center
of this deluge of proposed amendments. This discussion, while shedding great light on
the problem of self-determination in general, is beyond the scope of this article.
" These States were: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the German Federal
Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.
U The vote was seventy in favor, twenty-one opposed and thirteen abstentions.
The negative votes were cast by: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the German Federal
Republic, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.
The following States abstained: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Colom-
bia, the Holy See, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, the Philippines, Sweden, and Turkey.
The final Article was an amalgam of the proposed amendments and the ICRC
draft.
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flicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations. 75
Opposition was expressed by many Western States to the inclusion of
wars of national liberation, 76 yet it seems doubtful that they will ab-
stain from ratifying the Protocols which, on the whole, are acceptable
to these States.
In order to appease the apprehensions of these reticent States, article
4 was added to the Protocol. This article states, "The application of
the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion of the
agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict .. "
This argument has been repeated by Michel Veuthey who has writ-
ten, "[R]ecognizing the benefit of the application of humanitarian law
to an adversary does not imply the recognition of a certain political at-
tribute or legal status. It merely implies the recognition of his status of
human being."77 Yet this argument is logically inconsistent with the
spirit of article 1. If the concern of the delegates to the Conference
had merely been to afford a better protection of all individual com-
batants, a single Protocol would have been drafted. The fact that two
Protocols were adopted and that wars of national liberation were in-
cluded in the Protocol dealing with conflicts of an international
character does indeed change the juridical status of the liberation
movements.
Colonial peoples struggling for liberation have been confirmed to
be international persons. While they do not have the same rights as a
sovereign State, they do have certain international rights and obliga-
tions, most notably those recognized by the Protocols in the realm of
jus in bello. The supporters of these movements failed to foresee
however, that colonial peoples, being a subject of international law,
are bound to respect that law, including the prohibition of the use of
armed force. Thus while colonial peoples have gained, at least
theoretically, better protection under international humanitarian law,
71 Article 1 of Protocol I, note 70 supra.
76 For an interesting analysis of this opposition, see generally Abi-Saab, supra
note 67, at 72-77; see also Salmon, supra note 67 at 38-49.
11 Veuthey, supra note 67, at 102 (author's translation).
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their last trumpcard in arguing for jus ad bellum -that the conflict
was an internal one and thus beyond the competence of the inter-
national legal system-has been swept away.
VI. CONCLUSION
The resistance of the Western States to any legitimization of the
use of force against colonial regimes has deeply affected the develop-
ment of a jus ad bellum in favor of the liberation movements. This
resistance has induced the Afro-Asian and Socialist States to adopt
several theories relating to the inherent right of self-defence. When it
became obvious that the Western States would not accept this argu-
ment, a new idea was expounded, which might be called the rule of
exception. Realizing that international legal norms are a result of con-
sensus and not confrontation, the Afro-Asian States were entirely
aware of the futility of passing General Assembly resolutions which
were consistently devoid of the consent of a large and important bloc
of States. Hence, as is often the case in General Assembly Declara-
tions, the Afro-Asians endeavored to find a formula which would
create the largest possible consensus in an attempt to create legally
binding norms.78
Most scholars who have studied the legal effects of General
Assembly resolutions have reached the conclusion that in certain cir-
cumstances these create binding obligations.79 It is beyond the scope of
78 The lack of juridical significance of resolutions which lack this degree of con-
sensus was made clear at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. The
General Assembly, without the consent of the Western States, adopted Resolutions
2465 (XXIII), 2548 (XXIV), 2708 (XXV), 3103 (XXVIII) which declared that
mercenaries were outlaws and should be punished accordingly. Yet at the Conference,
when treaty provisions on this subject had to be drafted with the accord of the
Western States, a different formula emerged. Thus, article 47(1) of Protocol I provides
that a mercenary shall not have the right to be a prisoner of war, yet he would clearly
be entitled to the basic minimum standard guaranteed in article 75. The mere act of
being a mercenary is not to be considered as a crime. See Burmester, The Recruitment
and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1978). See also
Note, The Laws of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of
War, 9 CASE W. REs. INT'L L. 323 (1977).
19 See, e.g., Bleicher, Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly
Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444-78 (1969); R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN IN-
TERNATIONAL SOCIETY 174-84 (1970); R. HIGGINS. note 3 supra; Dugard, The Legal
Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid, 83 S. AFR. J. INT'L L. 40
(1966).
1979
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
this article to embark upon such an analysis, yet a few remarks about
the legal nature of the Declaration on Friendly Relations are in order.
It was adopted by a consensus of the General Assembly after seven
years of torturous debate in the Special Committee established for the
consideration of seven cardinal principles of the contemporary inter-
national legal system. 80 These debates were marked not by a majority
voting system, but rather by a system of unanimity. This system of
elaboration produced a document which was acceptable to every
Member State of the United Nations. This method was preferred to
the drafting of such a document by the International Law Commission
in the hope of gaining the greatest consensus possible. Its sole purpose
was to clarify existing principles of law which, by virtue of the Charter,
were already binding on all States. 81
The preeminence of the decolonization issue since 1960, the
tremendous volume of General Assembly Resolutions on this topic and
the legal nature of the Declaration all served to underscore the ex-
treme importance of the Declaration. One can only conclude that the
Declaration on Friendly Relations provides a clear and concise state-
ment of the international community's view of their rights and obliga-
tions in relation to the seven principles analyzed therein.8 2
It might be concluded that while all States have acknowledged the
existence of a right of self-determination, the question of the means to
that end is still a bone of contention. While the Afro-Asian and
Socialist States have argued in favor of an unrestricted right to revolt
in the case of wars of national liberation, 3 this idea has found little
support among the Western States. A certain movement toward the
acceptance of such a right can be perceived among the Western States
and may lead to the eventual recognition of this right in the same way
that the prohibition of the use of force against colonial peoples has
progressively been accepted by all States.8 4
80 G. A. Res. 1966, 18 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No.15) 74, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963).
81 Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of Internatonal Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 715 (1971).
11 Abi-Saab, supra note 67, at 66.
"
3The International Socialist Organization, which groups the major Social
Democratic parties of Europe and the Mediterranean, has aided the liberation
movements of Africa. LE MONDE, Sept. 13, 1977.
84 This concept is frequently found in resolutions dealing with wars of national
liberation, and was first enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It has been accepted by the Western
Vol. 11:71
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
At the moment an unlimited right to revolt does not exist. All
Member States of the United Nations, in both the Declaration on
Friendly Relations and the Declaration on the Definition of Aggres-
sion, have recognized a right to revolt by colonial peoples when armed
force8" is first used against them to prevent them from exercising their
right of self-determination. These declarations provide an accurate
resume of the state of international law on this subject.
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
have prejudiced the establishment of a jus ad bellum, by affirming
that wars of national liberation are international conflicts. While it is
true that such a classification will assure a greater protection for com-
batants falling within this category, it might be questioned whether a
single comprehensive protocol would not have been more effective for
two reasons. First, such a protocol would not have classified conflicts as
being either international or internal. If wars of liberation were con-
sidered as internal there would be no international prohibition to a use
of force. Second, such a protocol would have assured a more effective
protection for the vast majority of contemporary combatants who are
victims of non-international conflicts. It is obvious that the elevation of
wars of national liberation from the status of internal to international
wars has left little motivation for certain Third World and Socialist
States to ratify Protocol II and apply the law of war to internal con-
flicts. 86
States. See the remarks of the British representative. 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.18)
122, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). On this point both Western and Socialist States con-
tend that this obligation does not prejudice the right to employ police powers in order
to ensure the law and order of the territory.
85 Excluding police action to maintain the law and order. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protecting Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II, June 1977, Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16,
17). For a thorough discussion of the body of international law applicable in time of
war, see Abi-Saab, supra note 67, at 93-117; Baxter, note 67 supra.
6 See Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-
International Armed Conflicts 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 272-95 (1978). The greatest op-
ponents against the ratification of Protocol II argued that it had become irrelevant just
as wars of national liberation had been when elevated to the status of international
conflicts. These States were in particular those which either faced an actual or poten-
tial secessionist movement, such as India, Iraq and the Philippines. For a discussion of
the legal status of internal combatants, see Elder, The Historical Background of Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 37 (1979).
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